

Message Text

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE BELGIUM

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EXDIS-SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FOLLOWING SENT SECSTATE INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS FROM NATO
ON AUG 02, RPTD TO YOU:

QUOTE

S E C R E T

EXDIS

DEPT PASS SECDEF WASHDC, USCINCEUR AND USNMR SHAPE BELGIUM

E.O. 11652: GDS, 12-31-81

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: MBFR-AUGUST 1 COUNCIL DISCUSSION

SUMMARY. DRAWING ON PREVIOUS GUIDANCE, RUMSFELD PROPOSED
AT AUGUST 1 COUNCIL MEETING THAT COUNCIL DIRECT SENIOR POLADS
TO BEGIN WORK ON DEVELOPMENT OF COMPREHENSIVE ALLIED NEGOTIATING
POSITION FOR MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. GENERAL REACTION TO
U.S. PROPOSAL WAS FAVORABLE AND SUBJECT WILL BE FURTHER DISCUSSED
AT AUGUST 3 MEETING. CANADIAN REP CALLED ATTENTION TO DIFFERING
U.S. AND UK APPROACHES TO OPENING STAGE OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS
AND UK REP AGREED THAT THIS ISSUE WAS IMPORTANT.

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NETHERLANDS REP POSED QUESTIONS ON U.S. JULY 27 PAPER TO WHICH
RUMSFELD RESPONDED. TURKISH REP CIRCULATED TEXT (SEE SEPTTEL)
OF COMMENTS ON BELGIAN PROCEDURAL PAPER AND UK STEERING
BRIEF. CANADIAN REP CALLED ATTENTION TO NEED FOR AGREE-

MENT ON PUBLIC USE OF U.S. PAPER. DISCUSSION WILL RESUME
AUGUST 3. PER STATE 139940, RUMSFELD ADVISED THAT WE
COULD AGREE TO DOWNGRADE U.S. PAPER OF JULY 27 FROM
COSMIC TOP SECRET TO NATO SECRET BUT AGAIN STRESSED NEED
FOR CONFIDENTIALITY. END SUMMARY.

1. DRAWING ON EXISTING GUIDANCE AND FOR PURPOSE OF ENCOURAGING
ALLIES TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES, RUMSFELD
OPENED NAC MBFR DISCUSSION AUGUST 1 BY PROPOSING THAT
COUNCIL DIRECT SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE TO BEGIN WORK ON
DEVELOPING AN ALLIANCE APPROACH TO MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. RUMSFELD
SUGGESTED THAT TOTAL PACKAGE INCLUDE FOUR SECTIONS AS FOLLOWS:

- (A) BASIC GUIDELINES
- (B) NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL
- (C) NEGOTIATING STRATEGY
- (D) INTRA-ALLIANCE COORDINATION

SPC'S FIRST TASK, RUMSFELD URGED, SHOULD BE TO DRAFT A NEGO-
TIATING PROPOSAL. HE CIRCULATED PAPER (TEXT SEPTTEL) SETTING
FORTH PROPOSED MANDATE FOR SPC.

2. CANADIAN REP (MARSHALL) NOTED THAT COMPARISON OF U.S. AND
UK SUBSTANTIVE PAPERS POSED MAJOR ISSUE WHICH ALLIES SHOULD
ATTEMPT TO SOLVE: U.S. PAPER, HE NOTED, PROPOSED EARLY
TABLING OF SPECIFIC ALLIED PROPOSAL, WHEREAS UK PAPER PROPOSED
CONCENTRATION DURING INITIAL STAGE ON REACHING AGREEMENT WITH
EAST ON AGENDA. MARSHALL AGREED THAT SPC SHOULD BEGIN
INTENSIVE WORK PROGRAMS AIMED AT DEVELOPING MBFR NEGO-
TIATING POSITION, BUT SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD HELP IF
BASIC DIFFERENCES IN APPROACH BETWEEN U.S. AND UK PAPERS
COULD BE RESOLVED BY COUNCIL BEFORE SPC WORK BEGAN.
SYG LUNS AGREED THAT SPC NEEDED A CLEAR IDEA OF WHAT
COUNCIL EXPECTED IT TO DO AND EXPRESSED HOPE THAT AGREE-
MENT ALONG LINES U.S. SUGGESTIONS COULD BE REACHED AT
AUGUST 3 MEETING. UK REP (THOMSON) AGREED THAT POINT
RAISED BY CANADIAN REP WAS OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE AND
THAT DIFFERENCES IN APPROACHES BETWEEN THE TWO PAPERS SHOULD
BE RESOLVED OR AT LEAST DEALT WITH. HE ASKED WHETHER U.S.

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COULD AGREE THAT SECTION IN ITS PROPOSED MANDATE FOR SPC
WORK PROGRAM BE CHANGED FROM "NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL" TO
"POSSIBLE NEGOTIATING PROPOSALS AND APPROACHES."

3. RUMSFELD SUGGESTED IT WOULD BE UNPRODUCTIVE FOR COUNCIL
TO DEBATE PRECISE WORKING OF MANDATE FOR SPC. HE POINTED OUT
THAT U.S. PROPOSED MANDATE SPOKE IN TERMS OF "NEGOTIATING
PROPOSAL" AS A GOAL OF THE SPC WORK AND NOT AS SOMETHING NOW
AGREED. SPC WORK, HE SAID, WAS DESIGNED TO BRING ALLIES FROM
CURRENT POSITION, WITH NUMBER OF PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE, TO
AGREEMENT ON A NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL. THOMSON SUGGESTED THAT
GOAL MIGHT BE A SERIES OF NEGOTIATING PROPOSALS BUT HE SAID THAT
THIS ISSUE COULD BE EASILY RESOLVED BY U.S. AND UK DELEGATIONS.

4. NETHERLANDS REP (BUWALDA) POSED FOLLOWING SIX QUESTIONS, WHICH HE SAID REFLECTED THE HAGUE'S PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF U.S. PAPER OF JULY 27:

(1) DO U.S. AUTHORITIES ENVISAGE ADVANCING PRINCIPLE OF "COMMON CEILING" DURING THE FIRST PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS TO THE OTHER SIDE OR IS THIS CONCEPT ONLY PROPOSED AS AN INTERNAL NATO POSITION? RUMSFELD REPLIED THAT AS STATED PARAGRAPHS 13 AND 14 OF U.S. PAPER, WE PROPOSE TO USE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT IN DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER SIDE IN FIRST STAGE; WHETHER WE WOULD ASK SOVIETS TO AGREE WITH IT AT THAT STAGE IS A DIFFERENT QUESTION, HE NOTED.

(2) ASSUMING THAT U.S. PROPOSES TO ADVANCE CONCEPT OF OVERALL COMMON CEILING OF 704,000 TO OTHER SIDE AND IF IT IS FURTHERMORE SUGGESTED TO PROPOSE TO THE WARSAW PACT A REDUCTION IN THE FIRST PHASE OF 68,000 SOVIET TROOPS, IT IS REDUCTIONS OF THE REMAINING WARSAW PACT FORCES NECESSARY TO REACH THE PROPOSED CEILING. THIS CALCULATION HAS LED US TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT FORCES ARE SUPPOSED TO BE REDUCED BY ABOUT 122,000 OR ABOUT 27.7 PERCENT OF THEIR TOTAL STRENGTH DURING THE SECOND PHASE. ON WESTERN SIDE, ACCORDING TO U.S. FIGURES, REDUCTIONS WOULD BE ONLY 49,000 TROOPS DURING THE SECOND PHASE OR 8.1 PERCENT. THIS PROPOSITION SEEMS TO BE NON-NEGOTIABLE. RUMSFELD RECALLED U.S. PREFERENCE TO AVOIDING DEVELOPING CONTENT OF SECOND STAGE REDUCTIONS AT THIS TIME. HE AGREED THAT THERE WERE MANY OPEN QUESTIONS
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ON THIS MATTER BUT SUGGESTED IT WAS PREFERABLE NOT TO ATTEMPT TO PIN THEM DOWN NOW.

(3) IS IT U.S. INTENTION TO USE SOVIET CONCEPT OF "EQUALITY" MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 14 OF U.S. PAPER TO SUPPORT OUR PROPOSALS FOR A COMMON CEILING? RUMSFELD CONFIRMED THAT WE DID PROPOSE TO USE THIS CONCEPT.

(4) IS IT CORRECT TO INTERPRET PARAGRAPHS 18 AND 19 AS PROPOSING THAT CONSTRAINTS BE APPLIED ONLY TO THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA? RUMSFELD CONFIRMED THAT WE PROPOSED THAT CONSTRAINTS ONLY BE APPLIED TO NATO GUIDELINES AREA.

(5) SHOULD FIRST-PHASE REDUCTIONS BE LIMITED TO U.M. AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES, WHY WOULD IT THEN BE REASONABLE AND ADVANTAGEOUS FOR NATO (A) TO APPLY DURING FIRST PHASE THE CONSTRAINTS PROPOSED IN PARAGRAPH 19 A (2), (3), AND (4); AND (B) TO APPLY THESE CONSTRAINTS TO OTHER COUNTRIES AS WELL? RUMSFELD SAID WE ENVISAGE APPLICATION OF CONSTRAINTS AS RESULT OF FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT TO U.S. AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES.

(6) SHOULD WE UNDERSTAND PARAGRAPH 19 D TO SAY THAT CON-CIRCUMVENTION AGREEMENT IS ENVISAGED ONLY WITH REGARD TO SOVIET FORCES IN HUNGARY (AND NOT IN OTHER PARTS OF EASTERN EUROPE) AND THAT FOR HUNGARY ONLY NON-CIRCUMVENTION MEASURES AND NO OTHER CONSTRAINTS SHOULD BE ADVANCED? RUMSFELD NOTED THAT U.S. PAPER DOES NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESS THIS QUESTION BUT INDICATED THAT U.S. WOULD PRESENT ADDITIONAL IDEAS IN SEVERAL AREAS, INCLUDING THIS ONE.

5. BUWALDA SAID HE UNDERSTOOD U.S. DESIRE NOT GO DEEPLY INTO SECOND PHASE AT THIS TIME BUT ASKED IF IT WERE NOT LOGICAL TO ASSUME THAT WARSAW PACT STATES WOULD RAISE SOME OF QUESTIONS NOTED ABOVE, IN WHICH CASE ALLIES SHOULD PREPARE TO RESPOND TO THEM. HE SAID HE INTENDED RETURN TO "EQUALITY" CONCEPT AT AUGUST 3 MEETING AND SAID HE ASSUMED THAT U.S. ENVISAGED ONLY NON-CIRCUMVENTION MEASURES FOR HUNGARY.

6. CANADIAN REP OBSERVED THAT ONE OF U. S. PAPER'S MAJOR
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ATTRACTIONS WAS ITS POTENTIAL PUBLIC APPEAL AND SAID ALLIES SHOULD AGREE ON WHAT COULD BE SAID PUBLICLY ABOUT PAPER. SYG LUNS AGREED THIS WAS IMPORTANT POINT BUT SUGGESTED IT WAS PREMATURE TO BEGIN CONSIDERATION AT PRESENT TIME. RUMSFELD AGREED WITH CANADIAN SUGGESTION THAT ALLIES SHOULD, AT SOME POINT BEFORE OPENING OF NEGOTATION, DISCUSS PUBLIC POSITION AND DECIDE WHAT COULD BE USED. HE AGREED WITH NEED FOR ACTIVE POLICY PRESENTING ALLIED MBFR POSITION TO PUBLIC AT SOME POINT. (COMMENT: WE BELIEVE MARSHALL'S COMMENTS ARE WELL TAKEN AND WE WILL BE MAKING SOME SUGGESTIONS TO WASHINGTON. RUMSFELD
UNQUOTE ROGERS

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